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A Clouded View:  
How Language Shapes Moral Perception 
Kathryn Lilla Cox 
Introduction:
Flannery O’Connor writes in her novel Wise Blood, 
The black sky was underpinned with long silver streaks that looked 
like scaffolding and depth on depth behind it were thousands of stars 
that all seemed to be moving very slowly as if they were about some 
vast construction work that involved the whole order of the universe 
and would take all time to complete.  No one was paying any atten-
tion to the sky.1  
The images in this passage are striking for a number of reasons.  First, 
there is the sense that finding solutions or building new images, structures, and 
ways of being might not be completed during one’s lifetime.  The discipline of 
patience and long term planning with the sacrifice involved are qualities frequently 
hard to fathom in an age of almost instantaneous communication.  Second, this 
passage highlights what many of us already know, that the ethical life is complex 
and actions and decisions build upon each other.  Third, we can be forgetful and 
inattentive to our surroundings, only seeing a fraction of our landscape.  Finally, 
when we do look up at the sky, if we have learned particular constellations, we 
may find it hard to perceive new patterns or see the stars behind those most visibly 
present.  Thus, this literary excerpt symbolizes the related aspects of my endeavor 
to explore the connection between our concepts, which are language for describing 
reality, and the role these same concepts have in structuring how we interpret and 
perceive reality, especially pertaining to environmental concerns.
Convincing humans to change behavior proves difficult in a variety of 
disciplines and theological or religious ethics is no different.  Ethicists have 
at least a two-fold issue: one, their arguments for a particular ethical stance 
must be persuasive, and two, if their arguments are persuasive, they must also 
motivate people to change their behavior or choose a particular course of action.  
Frequently, ethicists, when describing ethical stances, have modeled their work on 
a particular type of scientific methodology consisting of identifying a problem, 
developing a thesis explaining the problem’s existence, and proposing a solution 
for solving the problem.  The difficulty with this model is it does not necessarily 
motivate people to adopt a type of action they deem valuable, particularly if their 
foundational assumptions about reality do not change.  Rather, internal conflict 
between values and worldviews can occur resulting in inaction or moral paralysis.  
In order to move beyond moral paralysis, encouraging changed behavior requires 
1 Flannery O’Connor, Wise Blood, (reprint, New York: The Noonday Press, 1967), 37. 
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helping people to reconceive their foundational metaphors or at least examine their 
foundational metaphors for overlooked or hidden insights into reality.
Foundational metaphors can be understood in two ways: (1) metaphors 
function as a structuring principle for providing an explanation and formation of 
reality and (2) metaphors can provide images that capture a basic, but influential 
understanding of those principles.  These images are important since they help 
bridge the gap that sometimes exists between concept and action, thus helping 
move someone from belief to action.  Furthermore, metaphorical images can 
supply the language to explain changed behavior.  Yet we do not yet have new, 
broadly accepted metaphors for life in the twenty first century, with our attention 
to environmental concerns and the consequences of our actions on climate change. 
I offer that these important functions of metaphor might help explain why 
burgeoning concern about the environment and the recognition that the way we 
live must change has not resulted in widespread transformative practice or action.  
A disconnect remains between theory, knowledge, and practice.  This partitioning 
indicates that new conceptual frameworks and knowledge about the earth may 
require new images and metaphors.  If we change or develop our theoretical 
conceptions without changing accompanying metaphors, then transformed 
action and change of attitudes may not follow, since the foundation or scaffolding 
remains unchanged.  An expansion of these ideas will proceed in three parts: 
examining the philosophy of metaphor, the dynamics of scientific presuppositions, 
and the language framing the discourse of environmental ethics using two case 
studies.
Part One: Epistemology and Philosophy of Metaphor
Prelude
Across disciplines in the twentieth and into the twenty-first century, 
practitioners re-engaged the questions: how do humans know and what is reason’s 
role in that knowing?  The answers to these questions are important because what 
and how we know influence our actions.  While these related epistemological 
questions are perennial, recent thinkers have wrestled with particular problems 
stemming from the manner in which Enlightenment thinkers answered these 
questions.2  Some attribute the core problems to Descartes, while others argue that 
Descartes is not solely responsible for current philosophical issues.3  For instance, 
2 See for example, John E. Thiel, Nonfoundationalism (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 
1994), particularly 1-37; Stanley J. Grenz, A Primer on Post-modernism (Grand Rapids, MI: William 
B. Eerdmans, 1996); Charles Taylor, Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1995), particularly 1-19.  
3 Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes’ Error, 250-2; Bernstein, Objectivism and Relativism: Sci-
ence, Hermeneutics and Praxis, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988), 16.  Bernstein is 
clear that there is a distinction between what Descartes actually said and the history of interpretation 
or what is called the Cartesian legacy.  Descartes’ thinking is more nuanced than often portrayed.  
For more detail see Bernstein, 115-118; also, Stanley J. Grenz, A Primer on Post-modernism, 57-81; 
See, Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theology (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1981), particularly 1-102.  MacIntyre does not look at Descartes in his review of 
the Enlightenment project.  He examines other key figures that he argues lead to the failure of the 
Enlightenment project as it relates to morality.  
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Richard Bernstein claims that Descartes in his search for a foundation to ground 
his knowledge exposed and articulated clearly the human tendency to think in an 
either/or schema for perceiving and solving problems.4  Descartes did not invent 
this either/or schema, he just provided “chilling clarity” of the core problem from 
which we all suffer.  Bernstein labels this core problem “Cartesian anxiety” and 
defines it as “[e]ither there is some support for our being, a fixed foundation for 
our knowledge, or we cannot escape the forces of darkness that envelop us with 
madness, with intellectual and moral chaos.”5  This either/or schema presupposes 
that the concepts, aspects of existence, or methodologies which ground our 
knowledge must be immutable.  Furthermore, it assumes that the acceptance of 
certain categories to construct a foundation entails the rejection of others.  The 
schema ignores the possibility that two ideas can each contain truth, or define 
aspects of reality, while concealing other aspects.  Furthermore, this schema 
presupposes an empiricist view of knowledge based on observation, the collection 
of data, and the verifiability of that data.  This type of knowledge is valuable, 
but it does not impart meaning.  Meaning making is what motivates and infuses 
our actions with purpose.  Stated differently, data and facts are not enough; the 
data and facts must be meaningful.  Humans exist in and must have knowledge 
and comprehension of the world in order to function and live.  This knowledge 
and comprehension of the world is framed by value systems and is instilled with 
meaning.  
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson are among the many philosophers, 
theologians, and ethicists attempting to overcome the dichotomies of polar 
opposites, either/or thinking.6  They identify two dominant but polar camps for 
comprehending the world, objectivism and subjectivism.  Objectivism is primarily 
concerned with the external world, that which is outside us, the environment 
we observe and use.  “Objectivism takes as its allies scientific truth, rationality, 
precision, fairness, and impartiality.”7  On the other hand, subjectivism is 
primarily concerned with the “internal” world of consciousness and interpretation, 
which attempts to formulate meaning.  Subjectivism “takes as its allies the 
4 Bernstein, Objectivism and Relativism, 16. 
5 Ibid., 18, (emphasis in original); idem, Philosophical Profiles (Philadelphia, PA: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1986), 9-12.  It is this either/or framework which Bernstein believes that de-
spite all recent philosophical attempts still haunts and remains the foundation for the existing tension 
in epistemological discourse.  This tension manifests itself under a variety of guises, for example in 
the foundationalist versus anti-foundationalist debate, the liberal-conservative debate, or any other 
debate where the participants are stereotyped into two opposing camps.  The result is usually a lack of 
dialogue.  Each side defends their positions, trying to convince the other of the error in their way of 
thinking, instead of trying to reach common insights regarding the human condition.  For a descrip-
tion of one attempt to overcome the either/or dilemma see James Keating’s Review of The Shaping of 
Rationality: Toward Interdisciplinarity in Theology and Science by J. Wentzel Van Huyssteen, in Thomist 
66/2 (April 2002): 315-20.
6 See for example, Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism; William C. 
Placher, The Domestication of Transcendence: How Modern Thinking about God went Wrong, 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1996).
7 Lakoff and Johnson. Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 
189.
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emotions, intuitive insight, imagination, humaneness, art, and a ‘higher’ truth.”8  
Since objectivism and subjectivism are defined in opposition to one another, they 
need each other to justify their position.  As with any opposition, one seeks to 
bolster their position, while dismantling the other.  Sadly, this discord means 
we, as affective- rational human beings, are torn.  We live with the tension of 
two competing visions of reality, external (objective) and internal (subjective) 
with appropriate times to be either objective or subjective.9  Lakoff and Johnson 
argue that neither the proponents of objectivism nor subjectivism adequately 
attend to the interconnectedness of our external and internal worlds.10  There 
is a relationship of mutual conditioning, influence and change, which exists 
between the internal and external worlds.  Therefore, they argue for a more 
synthetic approach that recognizes the human place within the created world, 
not outside of it, and acknowledges that there is “constant interaction with 
the physical environment and with other people.”11  For Lakoff and Johnson, 
metaphors provide one venue with which to account for how humans describe 
their observations, formulate meaning, account for truth, and perceive human 
cognition.12  They believe and argue that metaphor is neither a peripheral notion 
nor simply a linguistic style to convey information.  Rather, metaphor helps 
structure both human cognition and meaning.  
Furthermore, Mark Johnson, in Moral Imagination, argues that our moral 
language is impoverished and subsequently we lack creativity for thinking about 
emerging moral situations and the moral life in general.  Johnson argues that 
certain aspects of the Enlightenment legacy resulted in “a moral folk theory.”13  
The moral folk theory operates on the premise of reason and affectivity’s 
opposition, thus creating problematic conflict in human decision-making.  The 
conflict transpires because we prioritize deductive reasoning.  Rather than 
perceiving reason as purely logical and deductive, Johnson asserts that our human 
reasoning is actually imaginative.  His argument for an imaginative rationality 
allows additional possibilities for integrating poetic discourse into debates 
about environmental problems as a means of fostering changed behaviors and 
envisioning alternative courses of action.  However, our imaginative rationality 
relies on particular metaphorical frameworks that do not always adequately 
account for new insights.  Thus, our moral language is impoverished because 
we lack new metaphors, both for structuring and forming our worldview and as 
images to convey new or deepened insights.
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid.  
10 Ibid., 229. 
11 Ibid., 229-30. 
12 Ibid.,  185-86.
13 Mark Johnson, Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1993).  Hereafter referred to as Moral Imagination. For additional 
discussions of the Enlightenment legacy in Johnson’s work see, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, 
Philosophy in the Flesh: The embodied mind and its challenge to Western Thought (NY: Basic Books, 
Perseus Books Group, 1999), at 391-414; Mark Johnson, The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of 
Meaning, Imagination and Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), at xxiii-xxvix.
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Metaphor
Grammatically a metaphor is defined as “an indirect comparison that 
implies a likeness between two unlike things without using like or as.”14  The 
function of metaphors as an element of our grammatical system and as a literary 
trope provides a means to compare one object in light of another, highlighting 
similarities and differences.  However, recent studies,15 of which Lakoff and 
Johnson are part, recognize that “[m]etaphor is not merely a matter of language.  
It is a matter of conceptual structure.”16  This conceptual structure includes and 
arises from human intellect and experiences.17  In other words, concepts, including 
metaphors, form a structuring system that influences not only our thoughts, 
actions, relationships, formulations of meaning, and our interpretations of these 
things, but also influencing our perceptions of and presuppositions about the 
world.18  Moreover, as a building has more than one structural beam, so our 
conceptual system is composed of more than one metaphor.  Single metaphors 
lack the ability to explicate fully the depth of meaning contained within a concept. 
“So when we say that a concept is structured by a metaphor, we mean that it is 
partially structured and that it can be extended in some ways but not others.”19  In 
other words, metaphors both highlight and hide aspects of a concept, subsequently 
allowing comprehension of certain aspects of reality and hiding others.  Thus, 
multiple metaphors or sets of metaphors are necessary for the illumination of the 
multi-dimensional aspects of human reality.20  Therefore, taken together, many 
metaphors highlight the different aspects of a single concept.  
However, conflicts can and do arise if not everyone in the society accepts 
the new metaphorical structure or the changed actions which follow from new 
insights.  Lakoff and Johnson argue that the metaphorical structuring of our 
existence is so extensive and “familiar that we would normally not notice it.”21  
Thus, recognition that current and dominant metaphorical structures need 
to be exposed and examined frequently occurs only when a new or different 
metaphorical structure challenges perceived reality and meaning.  In other words, 
one experiences the occurrence of a paradigm breaking moment, which calls 
into question the previous understanding of reality.  New scientific information 
14 John E. Warriner, English Composition and Grammar, (Chicago, IL: Harcourt Brace Jova-
novich Inc., 1988), 249.
15 For an overview of other pertinent studies on metaphor and their relationship to moral 
theology, see Thomas R. Kopfensteiner, “The Metaphorical Structure of Normativity,” Theological 
Studies 58 (1997): 331-46, particularly 332-35.
16 Lakoff, Metaphors We Live By, 235.
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., 3. 
19 Ibid., 13. 
20 Ibid., 221. 
21 Ibid., 43. By way of example, I recently began trying to change my language when speak-
ing to a group that includes both women and men, or to a group comprised only of women.  The 
common linguistic phrase is to address a mixed group or a group of women as “guys.”  As in what 
are you “guys” up to, or what have you “guys” going to do today?  Speaking to a group of women and 
calling them “guys” functions I would argue in a similar way to using “men” or “man” to refer to all of 
humanity.  It ignores or obscures aspects of who women are as people. 
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can also lead to a restructuring of reality or worldview even if we do not have 
metaphors to describe this change yet.  
As stated earlier, if metaphors function as a primary “means of structuring 
our conceptual system,” and perspectives on reality, then “[n]ew metaphors have 
the power to create a new reality.”22  New metaphors initially provide new insight 
into our experience.  New insight in turn may create a change in action, which in 
turn roots and begins the creation of a new reality.  Subsequently, actions based on 
a metaphor’s entry into a conceptual system ultimately “will alter that conceptual 
system and the perceptions and actions that the system gives rise to.”23  In other 
words, our epistemology is altered, subsequently affecting our behavior and ethical 
or moral theory.
   Mark Johnson emphasizes that moral theory needs to be based upon a 
new vision of reason: imaginative rationality.24  Seeing rationality as imaginative 
is rooted in the work he undertook with George Lakoff on metaphor and its 
relationship to the structuring of our cognition.  They write,  
Reason, at the very least, involves categorization, entailment, and 
inference.  Imagination, in one of its many aspects, involves seeing 
one kind of thing in terms of another kind of thing — what we have 
called metaphorical thought.  Metaphor is thus imaginative rationality.  
Since the categories of our everyday thought are largely metaphorical 
and our everyday reasoning involves metaphorical entailments and 
inferences, ordinary rationality is therefore imaginative by its very 
nature.25 
In other words, our ability to reason rests partially on our ability to gather 
facts, information, and relevant data, followed by a critique and assessment 
of them.  Yet, reason also rests on our ability to project into the future, see 
the potential results of our decisions, envision possible directions, recognize 
and explain that “which cannot be comprehended totally.”26  Reason relies on 
22 Ibid., 145. 
23 Ibid., 145. 
24 In addition to Moral Imagination see, Mark Johnson, The Body in the Mind, 139-72; idem, 
“Imagination in Moral Judgement,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (Dec. 1985): 265-
80.
25 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 193 (italics in original).  For a brief history of 
the use of metaphor in philosophy, see Mark Johnson, “Metaphor in the philosophical tradition,” in 
Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor, ed. Mark Johnson (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1981), 3-47.  This book also includes essays by Max Black, John R. Searle, and Paul Ricouer, 
each of whom have influenced current understandings of metaphor.  For additional studies on 
metaphor see, Mary Hesse, Models and Analogies in Science (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 
1966); Max Black, Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy (Ithaca: Cornell Univer-
sity, 1962); Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning 
in Language, trans. Robert Czerny (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1984); idem, Essays in Biblical 
Interpretation, ed. Lewis Mudge (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980); Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr., ed. The 
Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2008).     
26 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors we Live By, 193; Johnson, “Imagination in Moral Judge-
ment,” at 280.
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deduction, objectivity, as well as imagination.  
 Imaginative rationality can be more succinctly defined as “that [which] 
is at once insightful, critical, exploratory, and transformative.”27  This type of 
rationality recognizes that often we are faced with situations where the “right” 
thing to do is not clear, and we need an additional insight beyond the principles 
at hand.28  Therefore, the ability to perceive alternative goods and values that 
might be at stake or to envision how certain courses of action would impact one’s 
relationships and ability to form a meaningful life becomes important.  However, 
the ability to critically examine or assess these “imaginings” remains crucial.  
The language of facts, descriptions of how things are, do not work.  Evocative, 
illuminating language becomes important.  How is imagination employed to 
create a vision, to help people see an aspect of reality overlooked, ignored, or to 
which we have been blind?
 So, if as Lakoff and Johnson argue, metaphorical theory helps reunite 
reason and imagination, what implications does this have for environmental 
ethics?  How do we raise awareness about the need for environmental 
sustainability?  How do we help each other see that we not only need to avert 
immediate short-term disasters, but need to plan for the longer-term effects of our 
behavior?  What new metaphors do we need to convey information?  Part two 
attempts to begin answering these questions by looking at how we have typically 
understood scientific knowledge.
Part Two:  
Scientific rationality
The work of philosopher of science Thomas S. Kuhn on scientific revolutions 
has been a touchstone in science and across disciplines.29  It has been criticized and 
its importance debated.30  Nonetheless, it represents an intellectual assessment of 
27 Johnson, Moral Imagination, 187; idem, “Imagination in Moral Judgement,” 265-66, 279-
80. 
28 Johnson, Moral Imagination, 75.  Imagination helps define the aspects of reason that can 
see differences and similarities between typical and atypical cases.  The weighing of the similarities 
and differences also requires determining, which older, already solved cases to use as prototypes.  This 
process is imaginative.  
29 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957); 
idem, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3d. ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996); 
idem, The Road since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 1970-1993, ed. James Conant and John Hauge-
land (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2000).  For Kuhn’s later reflections on his use of the 
term “revolution” see, Thomas S. Kuhn, “The trouble with the Historical Philosophy of Science,” in 
The Road since Structure, 105-20.  In this article Kuhn rethinks his use of the term, revolutions, argu-
ing instead for incremental changes in science.  Instead of paradigm shifts, he sees sub-specialties of a 
research field arising.  Thus, in this later work he likens changes in scientific knowledge and thinking 
to an evolutionary tree where different species can be traced back to a common ancestor.
30 See Margaret Masterman, “The Nature of a Paradigm,” in Growth of Knowledge (Cam-
bridge, 1970) and Dudley Shapere, “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,” Philosophical Review 73 
(1964), 383-94, cited in Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 174 note 4.  Additionally see, 
Steve Fuller, Thomas Kuhn: A Philosophical History for Our Times (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2000).
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science’s historical development that cannot be overlooked.31  Kuhn thinks that 
science is more than a linear accumulation of knowledge.  Rather, science includes 
a more dynamic process of historical development, growth, and transformation, 32 
consisting of starts, dead-ends, eureka moments, as well as the interplay between 
scientists themselves and societal, cultural, and religious worldviews, all of which 
influence new scientific insights.33  If scientists are formed by social, cultural, 
and religious worldviews, then scientific discovery and knowledge only partially 
describe reality.  This partial description of reality is due to what one’s worldview 
brings into focus and the inability to foresee all future ramifications, uses, or 
effects of new information.  For example, penicillin’s discovery was a boon for 
treating bacterial infections.  However, unknown at the time was the ability of 
bacteria to develop resistance to pharmaceuticals.  Therefore, today we struggle to 
treat some infections caused by antibiotic resistant bacteria.  Whether one views 
penicillin as a “miracle drug” or a treatment that may work against infection 
depends on one’s historical era.  Yet, in our era, the capacity to develop treatments 
for antibiotic resistant bacteria will require both normal and extraordinary science.
 According to Kuhn, normal science’s foundation is built upon 
accumulated scientific knowledge, facts, theories, and methods, which furnish a 
framework for subsequent scientific research.  This framework includes operative 
assumptions about the world, the framing of questions, and a methodology for 
proceeding.34  Kuhn observes that most questions, and the research to answer 
them, occur within the context of normal science.  Yet, some scientists may 
engage in what Kuhn calls extraordinary science where attempts to solve or 
explain anomalies or crises within science often require new assumptions, new 
perspectives, or new angles of analysis.35  
 This explanation might appear to indicate that a clear demarcation 
between normal and extraordinary science exists.  In reality, “extraordinary” 
science still depends on the accumulated insights of the scientific community, 
while engaging innovative methods of analysis.  This brief discussion about Kuhn’s 
work is meant to illustrate that scientific knowledge is conditioned and subject 
to revision in light of new observations and new insights.  As a result, scientific 
solutions to environmental issues will require drawing on methods both ordinary 
31 Steve Fuller states this about his own work.  See, Thomas Kuhn, 7.  For another secondary 
source that details Kuhn’s work and the development of his thought, see Paul Hoyningen-Huene, Re-
constructing Scientific Revolutions, trans. Alexander T. Levine (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1993).
32 Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution; idem, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions; idem, The 
Road since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 1970-1993
33 Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution, 132, 133, 141; The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1-9, 
140-3.
34 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 10-34.  For background to the idea of 
“normal science,” see Thomas S. Kuhn “The Function of Measurement in Modern Physical Science,” 
in The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1977), 178-224. For additional work on paradigms, see Thomas S. Kuhn, “The History 
of Science,” in The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change, 105-26.
35 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 82-89.
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and visionary, while remaining subject to future adjustments.
As a connection between philosophical discourses regarding science 
and metaphor and theological ethics, I am briefly going to examine the work 
of Thomas Kopfensteiner.  He accepts the premise that scientific practice and 
research begin with cultural pre-suppositions, values, beliefs and epistemological 
structures, all conditioning the scientist’s world view, their research projects, 
and methods.  Kopfensteiner then applies this premise to moral theory, arguing 
that “there is no pre-theoretical observation, all observation is theory-laden.”36  
Therefore, our observations of the natural world and human nature already have 
a framework or presuppositions and assumptions behind them.  This does not 
mean, however, that norms or principles arising from our observations lose their 
relevance and weight for moral action.  Kopfensteiner argues that the norm still 
offers guidance while remaining incomplete and needing further interpretation 
and explanation.  The incompleteness of the norm exists for two basic reasons.  
First, the formulation of the norm could not foresee all future situations.  Second, 
the meaning of the norm participates in the community’s “effective history of 
moral insight and experience.”37  This means that norms as well as history have 
“an autobiographical dimension.”  In other words, the norm’s meaning, how it is 
understood, applied, and interpreted, depends on the community utilizing the 
norm.  
Hence, the norm is not always applied in exactly the same manner.  Rather, 
there is an inherent dynamism between the norm and its application to moral 
situations.  This dynamism reveals the need to “[focus] on the creative impulse 
of moral reasoning,” in order to hopefully create “better alternatives of human 
being and acting in the world.”38  In other words, norms function analogously to 
metaphors, revealing and concealing various approaches to moral concerns and 
possible courses of action. 
Kopfensteiner indicates that a metaphorical structure of normativity allows 
room for questions of history and new or deepened moral insights, while retaining 
insights and achievements already arrived at by a community. His argument that 
norms governing actions are metaphorical, revealing and concealing aspects of 
reality, require us to ask if our language about the environment functions in a 
similar manner.  Is our language inherently metaphorical even when relaying 
scientific facts and data?  If so, how does the transmittal of scientific information 
structure our views or interpretations of that data?
Part Three:  Application
This section explores examples of environmental language framing.  This 
helps show how scientific language can function metaphorically since it evokes 
particular images, thus highlighting some features of reality or results of scientific 
research while ignoring or glossing over others. Various case studies illuminate 
36 Thomas R. Kopfensteiner, “Science, Metaphor, and Moral Casuistry” in The Context of Ca-
suistry, ed. James Keenan, S.J. and Thomas Shannon (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 
1995), 208.
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 213-14. 
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how the metaphors we use can help or hinder our ability to perceive moral 
problems and to motivate changed behaviors.  
 Many suburbanites have grass surrounding their houses, in other words, 
lawns.  They often apply fertilizer to feed the grass and other chemicals to kill the 
“weeds.”  It is this word weeds that I contend functions metaphorically to convey a 
variety of assumptions and values often unexplored in suburban America.  
The Oxford English Dictionary has multiple definitions for the word 
weed.  The word can mean “any herb or small plant;” it can be applied to “a 
shrub or tree;”  it can describe “a plant that grows wild in fresh or salt water;” 
and it describes “a herbaceous plant not valued for use or beauty, growing wild 
and rank, and regarded as cumbering the ground or hindering the growth of 
superior vegetation.”  It is this last definition, listed first in the OED, which has 
taken root in our imaginations and structures our approach to certain plants.  For 
many, weeds are to be destroyed, uprooted, and eradicated.  In the context of a 
food garden, where the aim is to grow plants for nourishment, eliminating plants 
(weeds) that prevent cucumbers, carrots, or other plants from thriving makes 
sense.  However, in the case of a lawn the use of the term weed or weeds indicates 
unexamined assumptions regarding plant functionality, economic status, personal 
character, approaches to beauty, and our inability to see the ripple effects of our 
actions.
For example, one weed dreaded by many lawn caretakers is the dandelion.  
It is seen as disrupting the uniform lushness and height symmetry of the grass.  
Furthermore, abundant dandelion growth signals to some neighbors either a 
diminished economic status or a character flaw.  The first assumption arises 
because it takes monetary resources to buy fertilizer and chemicals to control 
dandelion growth by killing them.  Therefore, if one is not killing the dandelions 
surrounding one’s house, one must not be able to afford the chemicals to maintain 
the lawn.  The second assumption regarding a character flaw stems from the 
belief that a responsible lawn caretaker will be responsible in other areas of their 
life.  Therefore, if your lawn is not the requisite height, lushness, and green, you 
must not be capable in other areas of responsibility either.  Neither assumption is 
necessarily correct.  People with dandelions surrounding their house might have 
one or more operating approaches to dandelions.  They might appreciate the color 
the dandelions provide at a particular time of year.  They might consider time with 
family, work, and community activism time better spent than on lawn care.  They 
might be aware of the affect of lawn care chemicals on soil, air, and water quality 
and therefore decline to use those chemicals.  Other people might be making use 
of the dandelions as food or medicine.39
Subsequently, the term weed, depending on its context of use, functions in 
different ways.  It can describe a plant with a value in its ecosystem, its function 
as food for certain species (including humans), and its ability to provide splashes 
of color adding to environmental beauty.  However, the term weed can also have 
39 See the following article for the various nutritional benefits of the dandelion.  http://www.
umm.edu/altmed/articles/dandelion-000236.htm (accessed August, 2010).
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negative connotations as something unwanted, problematic, and to be killed.  In 
either case, the concept weed not only defines a particular aspect of nature, it 
functions as a metaphorical shorthand to convey a certain worldview inscribed 
with operating assumptions and values.  In order to decrease or eliminate the 
use of chemicals on vegetation surrounding peoples’ homes, their worldviews 
must shift to include a vision of weeds as beneficial plants, alternative images of 
beauty, and a new comprehension of middle class economic responsibility.  There 
is evidence that this shift is beginning with the turn in many gardens, municipal 
areas, and suburban communities toward planting native and hardy species to 
decrease watering, fertilizing, and to minimize lawn cover.
The second case study is the BP Oil “Spill” in the Gulf of Mexico.  I would 
briefly like to unpack two sets of word choices.  The first is the use of the word 
“spill” and the second is the use of the “waging war” metaphor.  
The term spill connotes upending a solid or liquid from a container onto 
a surface.  Spills in common experience, whether at home or work, are visible, 
small enough to be manageable, quickly containable and they have an identifiable 
source.  On the other hand, a leak may or may not be immediately visible, it might 
mean finding the source with difficulty, it may be small or large, and may or not 
be easily containable.  Furthermore, the source of the leak might be in a different 
spot from where the results of the leak appear.  Therefore, the use of the word 
spill to describe the BP oil leak is not only misleading, but it provides a specific 
framework for thinking about cleaning up the oil.  Spill correctly identifies oil on 
the surface of the water, on vegetation, and animals.  It would seem to indicate 
that when we remove the surface oil we are finished with our task.  However, 
the term spill hides the reality that there is more damage to the Gulf region than 
simply surface oil to clean.  
The term leak on the other hand, indicates not only the type of accident 
that occurred but reminds us conceptually that once the leak is plugged, work is 
only beginning.  The reason for the leak must be addressed, one must investigate 
the distance the liquid travelled, and damage away from origination point must be 
repaired.  Anyone who has fixed a leaking pipe at home knows it is usually more 
expensive and difficult to fix than a spill.  Therefore, to speak of the BP oil leak 
in the Gulf triggers different conceptual frameworks than the BP oil spill.  A leak 
requires a longer-term commitment for repair, a recognition that not all damage 
may appear immediately, and a larger monetary outlay.  Thus, unconsciously or 
consciously, the more consistent use of BP Oil Spill feeds our collective impatience 
with the clean up and turns our attention away from the Gulf more quickly than 
using BP Oil Leak.  Furthermore, spill might feed our collective sense that when 
the surface oil is removed all is normal in the Gulf, when we really have not 
adequately assessed the environmental damage.    
The waging war metaphor to describe grappling with rig explosion, oil 
flowing from the broken pipe, and the effects of the oil in the Gulf also subtly 
shapes our comprehension of the problem, solutions, and time needed to recover 
from Gulf event.  The language of war conjures images of battles.  Battles are 
discrete, smaller events in the context of a larger project with a specific goal. They 
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usually have beginnings and endings.  Therefore, this image of fighting a war 
in the Gulf of Mexico against the oil rightly draws attention to the reality that 
scientists should (and did) prevail in stopping the leak.  There was a beginning 
and end.  However, this battle image, and the idea of an end, conceals the ongoing 
need to consider our effect on various ecosystems and formulate plans whereby 
we cooperate with the way ecosystems function rather than in opposition to their 
functioning.  Our relationship with the Gulf of Mexico ecosystem continues into 
the future, even after the oil is stopped; the relationship persists and does not end.
Furthermore, war has winners and losers.  This raises a question regarding 
approaches to oil in the Gulf (and other technological failings that affect life on 
the planet): Is the idea of winners and losers the right framework?  Scientists won 
against the pipe when they stopped the flow of oil; the pipe, so to speak, lost.  
However, winning and losing against a pipe draws attention away from how the 
water, soil, plant, fish, and avian life, as well as human livelihoods and health were 
affected by the spill.  What does “winning” look like as far as they are concerned?  
Are they simply the “collateral damage” of war?  Finally, war imagery does provide 
the potential to remind us that sacrifice is necessary to implement and complete 
a course of action.  This can be a positive reminder that approaches to ecological 
questions and our commitment to changed behavior requires sacrifice. 
Conclusion
In summary, section one focused primarily on explicating understanding 
of metaphor as neither a peripheral notion nor a linguistic style to convey 
information.  Rather, metaphor was seen as helping structure both human 
cognition and meaning.  Section two explored how scientific knowledge is 
not unbiased, but formed by cultural assumptions and values affecting our 
understanding and interpretation of new discoveries.  The last section briefly 
examined how language affects our interaction with the rest of the created world.  
Stemming from this work, our worldview and comprehension of our 
environment broadly conceived is based upon data and observation, but is also 
structured by meaning.  Moreover, it is our traditions (religious, scientific, and 
cultural) that transmit meaning.  Therefore, while supplying structure and a source 
of meaning for communities, traditions should not be embraced uncritically, 
but should be examined for what distorts or hinders genuine discourse and 
community.40  The ability to excise distortions and impediments within traditions 
remains vital since what a community values becomes the impetus for acting.  
Thus, distorted values lead to distorted communal structures and patterns of 
unjust actions.  These distorted values are often embedded in the language we use 
to describe events.  As a result, our discourse and reasoning cannot be taken lightly 
40 Jürgen Habermas, “ A Review of Gadamer’s Truth and Method,” 213-44, and “The Herme-
neutic Claim to Universality,” 245-72, both in The Hermeneutic Tradition: From Ast to Ricoeur, edited 
with an introduction by Gayle L. Ormiston and Alan D. Schrift (Albany, NY: State University of 
New York Press, 1990).  For a comparison of Habermas and Gadamer on the question of interpreta-
tion, knowledge and bias, see David Ingram, “Jürgen Habermas and Hans-Georg Gadamer,” in The 
Blackwell Guide to Continental Philosophy, ed. Robert C. Solomon and David Sherman (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 219-242.
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since it not only conveys information—it also conveys our values, assumptions, 
and motivates our actions.  Our discourse also influences our interactions with the 
rest of creation.  
 As Gadamer articulates, reason cannot be separated from its historical 
context, horizons of meaning, or human finitude.  Experience and insight turn 
upon each other.41  We are required, then, to be open to new experiences and 
willing to allow them to challenge our previously held beliefs.42  In this particular 
instance, experience would happen first, followed by reflection, insight and 
deepened self or communal understanding.  Experience which opens up beliefs to 
challenge encompasses affectivity within its structure since the challenge to beliefs 
frequently manifests itself through affectivity as discomfort.  Gadamer, with his 
hermeneutical approach to rationality and his discussion of the interplay between 
insight and experience, alludes to the distinction between scientific and moral 
rationality.43  Thus, environmentalists and those teaching environmental ethics 
might want to consider how to incorporate experientially based assignments into 
their courses.  Experience can disrupt operative worldviews moving a person to 
change their mind.  Or an examination of how we describe environmental reality 
would help expose operative values and assumptions hindering moral action.  
 According to Klaus Demmer, transformation of action begins with 
transformation of thought patterns.  Knowledge needs integration into moral 
reasoning with attention to both form and content (meaning).44  The form 
would be how we promote knowledge and meaning, the language forms we use.  
Metaphors are helpful in this instance since they require comparison and contrast, 
as well as capturing our imaginations.  Moral reasoning must be able to see what 
values and goods need protection and promotion.  The result should aim toward 
the common good and the ability of all to live the gospel good news.  Metaphors 
potentially permit us to tap the fecundity of our experience through their multi-
layered complexity of meaning.  This complexity of meaning includes the ability to 
jar us into perceiving reality differently, challenging our paradigms, creating fresh 
awareness about the world, while leading to transformed engagement and action.  
41 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 341-79.  
42 A theological assessment of this claim is made by Edward Schillebeeckx with his general 
explanation of experience, and his more specific analysis of contrast experiences.  See Edward Schil-
lebeeckx, Christ: The Experience of Jesus as Lord, trans. John Bowden (New York: Crossroad, 1993), 
30-64, 818-21.  For two studies which look at the relevance of this aspect of Schillebeeckx’s thought 
for moral theology see, Brian V. Johnstone, “The Experience of Conversion and the Foundations of 
Moral Theology,” Église et Théologie 15 (1984): 183-202; William P. George, S.J., “The Praxis of the 
Kingdom of God: Ethics in Schillebeeckx’s Jesus and Christ,” Horizons 12/1 (1985): 44-69.
43 Gadamer, Truth and Method.  This distinction arises in his discussion of phronesis see 20-
22, 312, 322, and 416.
44 Kopfensteiner, “Science, Metaphor, and Moral Casuistry,” 209; “The Metaphorical 
Structure of Normativity,” 331.  However, Klaus Demmer’s description of a perichoretic connection 
between theory and praxis implies more than a reciprocal relationship, indicating instead a penetra-
tion, an interweaving whereby the two factors remain unique with particular characteristics, but 
inseparable.  Also see Klaus Demmer, Moraltheologische Methodenlehre, 128-133.
